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Abstract
Hans Kelsen identified three possible relationships between the
international and domestic legal orders. Dualism understands the
international and domestic legal orders as separate and
independent. Monism describes a single and comprehensive legal
order but can operate with either domestic law or international
law as a higher order law. Like many domestic legal orders, that
of the United States has never fully worked out which of these three
options specifies the status of international law in its domestic
legal order. While the text of the United States Constitution
suggests a form of monism in which international law is
automatically part of the domestic legal order, the structure of the
Constitution does not permit such automatic incorporation. In a
2008 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a theory that
borders on dualism. The Court’s decision makes sense of some
recent U.S. practice, but it cannot be reconciled with either the text
or the structure of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, as a
consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision, the United States is
in danger of re-enacting the de facto primacy of domestic law that
the Constitution’s Framers sought to address by according
constitutional supremacy to treaty law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The status of international law in the domestic order varies
dramatically from state to state.1 Hans Kelsen identified three
basic theoretical possibilities that might describe the relationship
between international and domestic law.2 Kelsen promoted what
has come to be called “monism”; that is, the view that there is only
one legal order of which international and domestic legal systems
comprise parts. Within monism, Kelsen entertained two options:
either international law or domestic law could be at the top of the
hierarchy of legal norms.3 Kelsen associated the primacy of
domestic law with the ideology of imperialism and that of
international law with the ideology of pacifism. 4 Although Kelsen
himself claimed not to prefer one form of monism over the other,
Kelsen scholars have identified international supremacy as a
hallmark of his theory of international law.5 Only a few states
1

Two recent English-language volumes provide a comparative perspective
on the problem of the domestic application of international law: See 44 VAL. U.
L. REV. 759–956 (2010); THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009) [hereinafter
ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS].
2
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 328–47 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed.,
1967).
3
Id. at 332–44.
4
Id. at 346–47.
5
See JOCHEN VON BERNSTOFF, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY OF
HANS KELSEN: BELIEVING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Thomas Dunlap trans.,
2010) (describing the thesis of international primacy as the central project of a
Kelsenian “school” of international law).
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have fully embraced international law primacy by providing
mechanisms to automatically incorporate international legal norms
into the domestic legal order.6
In a dualist model, the international and domestic legal orders
are independent of one another.
Kelsen regarded such a
relationship between the international and domestic legal orders to
be “untenable,” because in his view that would produce a world in
which behavior that would be permissible in one legal order would
be impermissible in another.7 That is, there would be categories of
conduct which, no matter what an actor chose to do, would put that
actor in violation of some legal norm. This is not to say that
Kelsen believed that domestic legal orders would always enforce
international legal norms, but he was comfortable with the notion
that legal norms could exist even if they were not enforced—or
even if it took a long time for the proper authority to identify a
violation and provide a remedy. A legislature may pass an
unconstitutional statute, and that statute creates a legal norm until
it is rendered ineffective by a court or a supervening legislative or
executive act. Similarly, the fact that a state may adopt legal rules
that are at odds with international legal norms is a temporary
anomaly and does not, for Kelsen, give rise to a dualist system.8
Most domestic systems are complex hybrids rather than
instantiations of one of the available theoretical options.9 The
United Kingdom is often described as having a dualist system,
because Parliament must approve domestic implementing
legislation before treaties and rules of customary international law
can be introduced in the domestic legal order. This model has
been adopted in many of Britain’s former colonies, such as

6

See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 183–87 (2d ed.,
2007) (discussing states with monist systems) (discussing variants on monism in
five European states and Russia).
7
KELSEN, supra note 2, at 328, 329.
8
Id. at 330–31.
9
David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative
Analysis, 1, 6–7, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009).
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Canada, Australia, India, and Israel as well.10 But the fact that
there is a mechanism for domestic implementation of treaty norms
does not necessarily suggest a dualist system, so long as there is an
assumption that international norms will be incorporated into and
recognized as binding within the domestic legal order.
At the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted, the Framers
were well aware of the dangers of dualism. During the so-called
“Critical Period,” between the successful Revolutionary War and
the ratification of the Constitution, the ability of the national
government to operate under the Articles of Confederation was
stymied in significant part because the states did not consider
themselves bound by the national government’s international
agreements, including the Treaty of Paris that was intended to
effect a comprehensive post-war settlement with England.11 But
the United States system is neither monist nor dualist; rather, the
U.S. Constitution and U.S. constitutional history suggest
ambivalence about the status of international law as domestic law.
Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of the U.S.
constitutional design with respect to the incorporation of treaty
obligations into the domestic legal order. Although the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution clearly attempted to provide that treaties
would have direct effect, with a status akin to that of acts of the
national legislature, they did not come to terms with the difficulties
such a monist design posed for the constitutional scheme, which
envisioned both a federal system and a separation of executive and
legislative powers. Part III then addresses the development of the
10

Id. at 7.
See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
43–45 (2007) (describing difficulties under the Articles of Confederation in
enforcing both treaties and the law of Nations); David L. Sloss et al.,
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860 7, 9–12, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss,
et al. eds., 2011) (noting that under the Articles of Confederation, responsible
treaty enforcement fell to the states, which often failed to comply with treaties);
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 559, 616–19
(2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law] (citing discussions at the
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates).
11
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doctrine of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,
culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in
Medellín v. Texas,12 in which the Court seems to have adopted a
view on the status of treaty law that significantly diminishes its
efficacy as domestic law. The Article concludes by contending
that Medellín has left us with a rule on treaty law that cannot be
reconciled either with the text or the structure of the U.S.
Constitution. It neither gives treaties the status they ought to have
under the Supremacy Clause nor does it adequately protect the
constitutional separation of powers because, according to Medellín,
either the executive branch or the Senate can give domestic effect
to an international agreement merely by stating an intention to do
so. This bypasses the House of Representatives’ role in passing
domestic legislation. In addition, the Medellín decision makes the
United States a de facto dualist state and could potentially give rise
to the very situation that Kelsen described as “untenable.”
Conduct that is required under domestic law places the United
States in violation of its international legal obligations.
The discussion here focuses on treaty law and will address only
briefly the status of customary international law and international
agreements other than treaties as part of the domestic legal order.
In short, for prudential reasons, U.S. courts determined during the
first half of the twentieth century that international agreements that
are not treaties have the same domestic legal status as treaties.13
The constitutional status of customary international law has
become much more open to question in the past decade. Until
recently, there was a scholarly consensus, now known as the
“modern position,” that customary international law is binding
federal law.14 That view has been challenged by a group of
12

552 U.S. 491 (2008).
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (upholding assignment of
property to the United States through executive agreement over objection
grounded in New York state law); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937) (same). See generally RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 174–93 (focusing on
courts’ treatment of sole executive agreements as preempting state law).
14
See Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the
Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2011) (defending the
13
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revisionist scholars. In Erie v. Tompkins,15 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that there is no general federal common law.
Revisionists argue that, following Erie, federal courts no longer
have the power to recognize substantive rights that sound in
customary international law.16 Faced with an opportunity to decide
the issue in 2004, the Supreme Court refused to do so.17
II. TENSION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Any discussion of the status of international law as U.S. law
must begin with the Supremacy Clause, which states that all
“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land” and must be
enforced notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.18 This
constitutional provision, taken on its own, seems to suggest a
monist constitutional design. Indeed, in his discussion of monism,
Hans Kelsen provides a useful gloss on the purpose of
constitutional provisions like the Supremacy Clause within a
monist system:
[The] primacy of international law is compatible
with the fact that the constitution of a state contains
a provision to the effect that general international
law is valid as a part of national law. If we start
from the validity of international law which does
not require recognition by the state, then the
mentioned constitutional provision does not mean
modern position and characterizing it as the view that “customary international
law binds State actors and thus preempts State law applicable to State officials
and private parties”).
15
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16
See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 869 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
17
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Numerous scholarly essays
on the topic are gathered in International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court:
Continuity and Change (David L. Sloss, et al. eds., 2011).
18
U.S. CONST. art. VI, ¶ 2.
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that it puts into force international law for the state
concerned, but merely that international law—by a
general clause—is transformed into national law.
Such transformation is needed, if the organs of the
state, especially its tribunals are authorized (by the
constitution) to apply national law; they can,
therefore, apply international law only if its content
has assumed the form of national law . . . . 19
However, when the Supremacy Clause is considered in the context
of the Constitution as a whole, neither the Constitution nor U.S.
constitutional history provides unequivocal support for a monistic
interpretation of the domestic legal order.
The Supremacy Clause raises problems from the perspectives
of both federalism, that is, the allocation of powers between the
federal government and several states, and the separation of
powers among the three branches of the federal government.
While the Framers clearly wanted to resolve the federalism issues
in favor of a federal government empowered to bind the states
through treaties, they did not establish clear mechanisms for doing
so and would have had difficulty doing so because the issue was so
explosive. Still, after a few controversies during the Early
Republic, the issue did not arise in earnest until the late twentieth
century.20
The separations of powers implications of the
Supremacy Clause are far more vexing. If treaty law automatically
became incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal order, the
executive branch rather than the legislature could be the source of
domestic law. U.S. courts still struggle to specify how treaty
obligations can have domestic legal effect without federal
implementing legislation and to identify the mechanisms that
provide private rights of action in domestic courts where
obligations arising under international law have been violated.
19

KELSEN, supra note 2, at 336–37.
See Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901–1945, in
SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE 191, 194–206 (detailing how the Supreme Court routinely
enforced the United States’ international commitments of domestic law in the
first half of the twentieth century).
20
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A. The Supremacy Clause and Monism
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to incorporate
treaties into domestic law with something like direct effect. The
purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S. treaty
violations “by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at the
behest of affected individuals without awaiting authorization from
state or federal legislatures.”21
The Framers viewed this
presumption of “self-execution,” as it came to be called, as a
marked departure from the laws of England and to American
practice under the Articles of Confederation.22 As Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent in Medellín,23 the Framers thought the
Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that
substantially frustrated the government’s ability to comply with
treaty obligations, as had occurred in the 1780s.24
Although the drafters of the U.S. Constitution debated the
matter and reached a clear consensus that treaties should have
direct effect as domestic law, they did not specify how that result
would be achieved.25 While James Madison hinted vaguely at a
role for the House of Representatives in implementing at least
some treaties, John Jay thought it acceptable if treaties were made
binding without the approval of the legislature. He did not view
legislatures as the exclusive source of law, because courts can also
make law. Nor did he think it appropriate that the legislature have
a power to repeal treaties, because treaties are a pact between two
21

Carlos M. Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 98 AM .
J. INT ’L L. 695, 696 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, The Four Doctrines].
22
John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 1209, 1217–18 (2009); Vázquez, The Four
Doctrines, supra note 21, at 698.
23
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 543–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting, 2008).
24
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 270 (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937) (J.
Madison) (noting that the power of the federal government to enter into treaties
was “frustrated by regulations of the states” under the Articles of
Confederation).
25
See Parry, supra note 22, at 1223–27 (concluding that while the
Constitutional Convention reached an agreement about treaties, “it failed to
explore the implications of that agreement”).

Monist Supremacy Clause

9

states and one party should not be permitted unilaterally to cancel
such a bargain.26
The issues that the Framers failed to resolve at the
Constitutional Convention gave rise to lively debates in the state
ratification assemblies. During the ratification debates, the
supporters of the Constitution, known as Federalists, took a
number of positions. Nearly all agreed that treaties would be
supreme law, overriding inconsistent state law. Some went further
and argued that all treaties would be self-executing and would
trump federal statutes.
But leading Federalists, including
Alexander Hamilton and Madison, acknowledged that, whether or
not treaties were law, they could only be implemented effectively
through action by both Houses of Congress. Anti-Federalist
positions mirrored those of the Federalists and were at least as
divergent. Not surprisingly, among Federalists, Madison seems to
have had the greatest appreciation for the dangers self-executing
treaties posed for the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. Unfortunately, Madison reached no clear conclusions.27
B. Structural Constitutional Elements Suggesting Dualism
In the decades that followed, constitutional tensions between
the Supremacy Clause and both federalism and separation of
powers doctrines became a source of political contestation. The
states were reluctant to accept the supremacy of treaty law over
their sovereign power.
At the same time, the House of
Representatives sought a greater role in the approval and
implementation of legal norms arising from treaty obligations. The
federalism issue was settled quite quickly and largely remained
settled in favor of the federal government until the end of the

26

Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 351–52 (J. Madison) (observing that
treaty implementation will “sometimes demand particular legislative sanction
and cooperation”) with THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 421 (J. Jay) (describing
treaties as binding and “beyond the reach of legislative acts”).
27
Parry, supra note 22, at 1228–64 (reviewing relevant debates in the states’
ratification assemblies).
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twentieth century.28 Early in the nineteenth century, Chief Justice
John Marshall introduced the distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties in order to address separation of
powers concerns. 29
The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties are ratified by the
President with the “advice and consent” of two-thirds of the
Senate.30 The House of Representatives has no formal role in the
approval of treaties, nor do the states, although because Senators
are elected on a state-wide basis, they are supposed to represent the
state interests in the federal government.31 If the President and the
Senate can pass supreme law with direct domestic effect, they can
bypass the House of Representatives and thus leave out of the
legislative process one of the two houses of the legislature.
Because Representatives are elected every two years,32 the House
is the most democratically accountable branch of the U.S.
government.
If the Framers’ purpose was to establish a
representative government responsive to the wills of the electorate,
it would be especially problematic if Congress’s legislative
primacy could be bypassed through the treaty power. Moreover,
permitting the President and the Senate to bypass the House of
Representatives through the treaty power would be politically
28

See Lori F. Damrosch, Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John
Jay to John Roberts, in SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 451, 457–58 (noting that Medellín
and other, similar cases rejecting the enforceability of treaty rights in favor of
state procedural rules “arguably invert the priority established by the Supremacy
Clause” and intimating that the Supreme Court would not have considered doing
so until recently).
29
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (finding a treaty
between the United States and Spain to be non-self-executing). But see United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (reviewing the Spanish text of
the same treaty and finding the treaty to be self-executing).
30
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 6.
31
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–53
(1985) (citing authorities on the ways in which the federal government is
designed to be responsive to the interests of the states); RAMSEY, supra note 11,
at 300–17 (noting that the treaty power was not originally viewed as a threat to
the states because state legislatures controlled election to the Senate).
32
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.

Monist Supremacy Clause

11

hazardous, because all appropriations bills must begin in the
House.33 The executive branch could, with the blessing of the
Senate, commit the United States to international obligations that
Congress could prevent it from fulfilling. The result would be an
untenable dualism.
Madison recognized this problem during the ratification
debates. Although he viewed treaties as supreme law,34 he
acknowledged that commercial treaties might require “particular
legislative sanction and cooperation.”35 Hamilton also recognized
that some treaties could not be implemented fully without
congressional participation.
At times, however, Madison
suggested that the participation of the Senate alone was enough,
and Hamilton concluded that Congress had a duty to implement
obligations entered into through treaty.36
The Framers thus transformed the legal question into a political
question, and that is where things have remained to this day.
While the House of Representatives has no formal, constitutional
role in treaty making, treaties with domestic consequences require
House approval for implementation. If the United States were to
enter into a treaty without first securing congressional support, it
would likely take on an international obligation that it could not
fulfill due to domestic impediments, thus putting the government
in violation of its international obligations and negating any
substantive or foreign policy benefits that might derive from
participation in the treaty regime.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW DUALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Because the Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not resolve
the tensions between the Supremacy Clause and two structural
elements of the Constitution, federalism and the separation of
powers, the status of international law in the U.S. domestic order
has been far more a product of U.S. constitutional history than it
33
34
35
36

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 295–96 (J. Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, 352 (J. Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 486 (A. Hamilton).
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has been determined by the text of the Constitution. The
separation of powers issue was resolved in part through political
mechanisms and in part through the doctrine of non-self-execution.
The federalism issue seemed resolved early in U.S. history in favor
of treaty supremacy. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín calls that resolution into question.
The tension between the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of
separation of powers led almost immediately to a constitutional
crisis over the implementation of the Jay Treaty with Britain of
1794.37 The Jay Treaty was in part a commercial treaty, and as the
Constitution allocates powers over international commerce to
Congress, leaders of what would become the Jeffersonian
Republican Party in the House of Representatives, including James
Madison and Albert Gallatin (Jefferson’s Treasury Secretary),
insisted on a congressional role in implementing the Jay Treaty.38
Federalists sought to insist that treaties were supreme and that the
House of Representatives had a duty to pass laws necessary to
implement them.39 In the end, the House of Representatives
narrowly approved appropriations to implement the treaty but
refused to acknowledge its duty to do so.40
Republicans in the House similarly objected to the surrender of
a criminal suspect pursuant to extradition provisions of the Jay
Treaty that had never been implemented through congressional
legislation.41 Republican insistence on a role for the House of
Representatives in the treaty process diminished markedly during
Thomas Jefferson’s administration when it became necessary to
bring negotiations with France over the Louisiana Purchase to a

37

Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannic
Majesty and The United States of America, 8 Stat. 116 (1794).
38
5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 437 (1796).
39
Id. at 722. Hamilton made similar arguments in the press. See 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3 ff. (Harold R. Syrett ed., 1974).
40
5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1291 (___).
41
See Parry, supra note 22, at 1295–1303 (summarizing congressional debates
from 1800).
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timely conclusion.42 Nonetheless, Gallatin still insisted on the
importance of the House’s role in treaty implementation.43
These debates arose anew when President James Madison
called upon Congress to implement provisions of the Treaty of
Ghent, which ended the War of 1812 and which Madison ratified
in December 1815.44 After lengthy debates in both Houses of
Congress, the House and the Senate agreed on a compromise that
left basic constitutional controversies unresolved but recognized
two general principles that informed future treatments of the status
of treaties as domestic law. First, Congress developed the last-intime rule, according to which treaties could trump prior legislative
enactments but Congress could also override a treaty through a
legislative act.45 Second, Congress recognized that, while some
treaties could have direct effect as domestic law and thus were
self-executing, others required implementing legislation.46
A. The Doctrine of Non-Self-Execution
As discussed above, the Supremacy Clause and its legislative
history suggest that the Framers intended for treaties to have direct
effect as domestic law. Evidence from the first decades of U.S.
history enhances the sense that the Framers and their
contemporaries assumed that treaties would be given direct effect
as domestic law. In the first case in which it weighed in on the
issue, Ware v. Hylton, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right
of a British creditor to seek relief in a U.S. court under the 1783

42

Although Jefferson at first insisted that a constitutional amendment was
necessary before the President could double the size of the United States through
a treaty, he ultimately bowed to expediency and advised Gallatin that the less
said about the legal basis for the treaty, the better. Matthew S. Warshauer,
Constitution of the United States, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE: A HISTORICAL
AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 83, 84 (Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2002)
43
Parry, supra note 22, at 1294.
44
Id. at 1304–16.
45
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) and Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
46
Parry, supra note 22, at 1316.
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peace treaty that ended the Revolutionary War.47 Ware may well
have put to rest federalist challenges to the efficacy of the
Supremacy Clause,48 but it did not resolve separation of powers
questions relating to categories of treaties that called for
congressional implementation.
Confronted with this constitutional conundrum in 1829, Chief
Justice John Marshall determined that treaties intended to have
domestic effect cannot do so without some sort of legislative
intervention: “[W]hen the parties engaged to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the Court.”49 Marshall thus articulated what
eventually became known as the doctrine of self-execution.50 A
self-executing treaty is one that has “automatic domestic effect as
federal law upon ratification.”51 Generally speaking, if a treaty is
self-executing it creates a domestic legal obligation without the
need for a congressional enactment.
For much of U.S. constitutional history, treaties were largely
assumed to be self-executing, and treaties that created private
rights were assumed to give individuals standing to sue to
vindicate those rights. Justice Marshall himself embraced this
notion as early as 1809, when he noted that treaties “stipulate
something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives
them rights.” Marshall regarded it as a duty of courts to protect
such treaty rights against all contrary laws and judicial decisions of

47

3 U.S. (3 Dall). 199, 239 (1796).
Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to
embrace the doctrine of treaty supremacy over state law that it adopted in Ware.
Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900, in,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
55, 56 (Sloss et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme
Court].
49
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
50
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that nonself-executing treaty provisions “can only be enforced pursuant to legislation”
and that such legislation is subject to congressional modification and repeal).
51
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 at 502 n.2 (2008).
48
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states.52 So the doctrine remained throughout the nineteenth
century. As Justice Miller put it in 1884,
A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of
Congress is whenever its provisions prescribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject
may be determined. And when such rights are of a
nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the
case before it as it would to a statute.53
However, this presumption in favor of the applicability of treaties
as domestic law was largely theoretical as, before World War II,
the United States was a party to very few treaties that created
private rights.54 In the second half of the twentieth century, when
the United States’ treaties obligations exponentially increased,
courts became more skeptical of the presumption in favor of selfexecution and they de-coupled the finding that a treaty was selfexecuting from a finding that it gave rise to a private right of
action.55
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Medellín v. Texas
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a method for
establishing when treaties are to be treated as self-executing.
Medellín was a Mexican national who was on death row in Texas,
having been convicted on murder charges.56 Medellín brought a
habeas challenge to his conviction and sentence, contending that he
had been denied his rights of consular access and consultation in
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
52

Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809).
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884); see also Hollis, Treaties
in the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at 66–67 (noting that the Supreme Court
“regularly applied treaties as law for individuals,” allowing them to invoke
treaties directly and to affording them both rights and remedies).
54
Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow,
International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L
L. 51, 53 (2012) [hereinafter Hathaway et al., International Law].
55
Id. at 63–68.
56
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501.
53
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(VCCR).57 In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena),58 the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) had found that the United
States had violated its international obligations under the VCCR
with respect to certain Mexican nationals in criminal custody in the
United States.59 The ICJ ordered the United States to provide
“review and reconsideration” of each challenged conviction and
sentence to determine whether the Mexican nationals, including
Medellín, had been prejudiced by the violation of their rights of
consular consultation.60
Although the United States disagreed with the Avena decision,
President Bush issued a memorandum to the Attorney General,
stating that the United States would comply with the Avena
judgment by directing state courts to implement that judgment.61
In Medellín’s case, the Texas criminal courts refused to do so. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín’s post-Avena
habeas petition as an abuse of the writ. The Texas court did not
view either the Avena decision or the President’s Memorandum as
capable of displacing state limitations on the filing of successive
habeas applications.62
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In a decision
written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court concluded that “neither
Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the
filing of successive habeas petitions.”63 As the Medellín majority
put it, while treaties “may comprise international commitments . . .
they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
57

See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963,
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no. 6820 (providing that foreign nationals in penal
custody must be permitted to communicate with representatives of their
consulate).
58
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
59
Id. at 53–55.
60
Id. at 72.
61
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S.
Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005).
62
Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
63
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008).
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implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that
it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”64 There was
no implementing legislation for either the VCCR or the U.N.
Charter provision calling on member states to comply with
decisions of the ICJ. Therefore, in order for the ICJ’s decision in
Avena to bind the state courts that were to provide the review and
reconsideration called for in Avena, the U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned, the decision would have to bind the United States with
the sort of direct effect derived from a self-executing treaty.
The only treaty that came into question as potentially selfexecuting was the U.N. Charter, Article 94(1) of which provides
that member states are to “undertake to comply” with the decision
of the ICJ.65 In order to determine whether or not Article 94(1)
was self-executing, the Medellín majority had to specify the nature
of the inquiry used to determine when treaties are to be treated as
self-executing. Its effort to do so was not entirely successful.
Prior to Medellín, lower courts had largely relied on a
multifactor balancing analysis to determine whether or not a treaty
should be given domestic effect.66 The Medellín majority rejected
the position of the Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which favored a presumption in favor of
treating treaties as self-executing.67 Rather, the Medellín majority
held that a treaty is self-executing only if it “contains stipulations
which are self-executing, that is, that require no legislation to make
them operative.”68 The Court thus subtly changed Justice
Marshall’s rule that, consistent with the Supremacy Clause,
rejected a presumption against self-execution.69 The rule laid
64

Id. at 505 (citing Igartua–De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
65
Charter of the United Nations art. 94(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
66
See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions and Non-Self-Executing
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540 (2008).
67
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111, Reporter’s Note 5 (1987).
68
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505–06 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888)).
69
Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 11, at 629.
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down in United States v. Percheman was that treaties would be
treated as self-executing unless the treaty itself “stipulat[es] for
some future legislative act.”70 The Medellín majority invented a
requirement that there be some language, either in the treaty itself
or provided by the President or the Senate, indicating selfexecution if a treaty is to be directly effective as domestic law. The
Medellín dissent faults the Medellín majority for looking for “the
wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution)
using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty
language).”71 The majority accepts this characterization of its
approach. 72
The majority’s textual approach has a certain common sense
appeal. It seems reasonable to expect that, if the parties to a treaty
expected that instrument to be self-executing, they would so state.
However, as the Medellín dissent pointed out, the majority named
no treaty that contains express language specifying that it is to be
self-executing. That is not surprising because international
agreements generally do not reference the mechanics of domestic
implementation beyond the occasional statement of an expectation
that parties will take whatever steps are necessary to incorporate
treaty obligations into domestic law.73 But the majority did not
require such an express statement, as it repeatedly indicated that
either the President or the Senate could at any point during the
ratification process, express intent to have a treaty be selfexecuting: “Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a
treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who
negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has
domestic effect.” 74
In order to make sense of this approach to treaty interpretation,
we need to review the way the United States takes on treaty
obligations. Treaty ratification is a three-step process in the United
States. First, a representative of the executive branch signs the
70
71
72
73
74

United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 562 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 514.
Id. at 547–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 521.
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treaty.75 Next, the Senate provides its advice and consent,76 and at
that time the Senate may attach reservations, understandings, and
declarations.77 For example, in providing advice and consent to
various human rights instruments, the Senate has attached
declarations that the substantive provisions of such treaties are
non-self-executing.78 Finally, the executive ratifies the treaty, and
in so doing the President may make some statement about the
domestic status of the instrument, although the constitutional status
of such a statement is indeterminate, and Medellín did not make it
any less so.79 After all, the Medellín majority did not think the
President’s Memorandum directing states to implement the Avena
decision was sufficient to render a treaty self-executing.80 A
presidential statement made in connection with the deposit of an
instrument of ratification should not be entitled to any different
treatment.
The Medellín majority held that Article 94(1) of the Charter
could not be self-executing, because the language “undertakes to
comply” suggests that some additional action by the state is
required in order to give effect to an ICJ judgment.81 Indeed, the
Charter contemplates the possibility that a state will not comply
with an ICJ judgment and provides for a political remedy in
75

RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. S. PRT. 106–17, TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATe 6–7 (2001) [hereinafter CRS, TREATIES].
76
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
77
CRS, TREATIES, supra note 75, at 7–12.
78
See 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (1994) (recording reservations to the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination); 138
CONG. REC. 8068 (1992) (recording the Senate’s reservations, declarations, and
understanding relevant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights); 136 CONG. REc. 36192 (1990) (recording Senate reservations to the
U.N. Convention against Torture); 132 CONG. REC. 2326 (1986) (recording
Senate reservations to the Genocide Convention).
79
See Hathaway et al., International Law, supra note 54, at 99–100
(acknowledging criticisms of presidential signing statements, but contending
that presidential statements in connection with transmittal of treaty ratifications
might require different treatment).
80
Id. at 527–28.
81
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008).
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Article 94(2) through recourse to the U.N. Security Council.82
Finding that neither the U.N. Charter nor the VCCR provided a
ground for treating the ICJ’s Avena decision as a rule of decision
binding on the Texas courts, the Medellín majority affirmed the
judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,83 and Texas
proceeded with the execution.84
At least with respect to non-self-executing treaties, the United
States is thus returned to the condition it was in during the Critical
Period. The federal government has taken on a treaty obligation
with which it cannot comply because the states refuse to recognize
that obligations of the United States are also obligations of the
several states. Ironically, the self-proclaimed originalist Justices
joined the majority and embraced an interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause clearly at odds with the Framers’ understanding
of that clause.85
The Medellín opinion leaves room for considerable uncertainty
as to what consequences derive from a determination that a treaty
is non-self-executing. As Duncan Hollis points out, calling a treaty
non-self-executing may mean that: (1) private litigants cannot rely
on it as a source legally cognizable rights; (2) such rights are not
justiciable in any domestic court; or (3) that non-self-executing
treaties do not have any force as domestic law.86 The Court also
inserted in a footnote a rather troublesome bit of dicta, announcing
its endorsement of a presumption that even self-executing treaties
do not give rise to a private right of action,87 thus reversing a
82

Id. at 509–11.
Id. at 532.
84
James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008).
85
See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD L. REV. 377
(2009) (contending that the majority’s ruling in Medellín cannot be reconciled
with the types of originalism embraced by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
86
See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 PROC. AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008); see also Bradley, supra note 66, at 548 (“The opinion
leaves unclear . . . whether a non-self-executing treaty is simply judicially
unenforceable, or whether it more broadly lacks the status of domestic law.”).
87
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (“Even when treaties
are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background
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presumption that had long been part of U.S. law that self-executing
treaties that created private rights also created a means of
vindicating those rights.88 Recent research suggests that lower
courts are interpreting Medellín to further reduce the domestic
enforceability of international agreements, applying dicta from
Medellín to prevent individual litigants from relying on treaties
that were clearly intended to protect their rights.89
C. Continued Tension Between Constitutional Design and
Constitutional Practice
The Medellín Court’s solution does not resolve the continuing
tensions in the U.S. constitutional design regarding treaties. On
the contrary, it revives tensions sounding in federalism that had
been put to rest in the Early Republic and exacerbates tensions
sounding in separation of powers. However, while the decision
likely precludes the development of a satisfying legal theory that
reconciles the Supremacy Clause with U.S. constitutional design
and history, there are political remedies that can push legal
uncertainties into the background.
1. The Revival of Federalism Concerns
Medellín revives the tensions between the Supremacy Clause
and the principle of federalism that had lain dormant since the
early nineteenth century. The issue in Medellín was whether Texas
could execute a murderer without granting him the review and
reconsideration that even the Medellín Court acknowledged was
required as a matter of international law.90 Although the
Supremacy Clause states that courts must enforce treaty law
notwithstanding state law to the contrary, the Medellín majority
presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting
private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts.”).
88
Hathaway et al., International Law, supra note 54, at 53.
89
Id. at 70–76.
90
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504 (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—a
decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted
to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an
international law obligation on the part of the United States.”).
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effectively limited the efficacy of the Supremacy Clause to selfexecuting treaties, a category that it defined in a way that would
rule out treating almost all treaties then in existence as selfexecuting.
This aspect of the Medellín decision raises the specter of a new
dualism, akin to that which plagued the country during the Critical
Period. Medellín is only the most recent case in which the
Supreme Court effectively threw up its hands and declared itself
incapable of requiring the states to comply with obligations of the
United States arising under the VCCR.91 It is now clear that,
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, courts are not in fact
empowered to enforce treaties in the face of contrary state law.
Seen in this light, Medellín effects a partial reversal to the
nineteenth-century resolution of the tension between treaty
supremacy and federalism. Where federal treaty law once
prevailed over contrary state law, state law now prevails over a
treaty unless it is expressly self-executing (and very few are) or is
implemented by Congress. Because the Supremacy Clause clearly
provides that congressional enactments supersede state law, the
holding almost completely eliminates the efficacy of the
Supremacy Clause’s reference to treaties.
2. Persistent Separation of Powers Concerns
The Medellín majority effectively masked the unprecedented
federalism consequences of its decision by treating the case as
posing separation of powers issues. The Court reasoned that the
power to implement non-self-executing treaties resides exclusively
with Congress.92 The Court refused to construe as acquiescence
Congress’s failure to either act or to object to the President’s
memorandum directing states to comply with the ICJ’s Avena
91

See LaGrand v. Stewart, 525 U.S. 971 (1998) (denying habeas petition of
two German nationals challenging their convictions and sentences on the ground
that their VCCR rights had been violated); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (denying habeas petition of Paraguayan national subject to death penalty
while Paraguay pursued a claim in the ICJ against the United States for violating
Breard’s VCCR rights).
92
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527.
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decision.93 This part of the decision seems like a resolution of the
tension between the separation of powers doctrine and the
Supremacy Clause by subordinating the constitutional text to the
structural principle. But Medellín does not do that either.
James Madison and other Framers recognized that, in order to
reconcile the principle of treaty supremacy with the separation of
powers, certain treaties could not be effective as domestic law
without congressional implementation. Madison suggested that the
category of such non-self-executing treaties might encompass all
treaties containing subject matter that overlaps with Congress’s
powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The
Medellín majority articulates no such principled delineation of
which treaties require congressional implementation. Whether or
not the President, with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate can
make domestic law through a treaty turns, for the Medellín
majority, on whether or not they state an intention that the treaty be
self-executing as domestic law.
Neither the Court nor subsequent commentators have identified
a principled reason for giving the President and the Senate such
unilateral power to override the House of Representative’s
legislative powers. Nor does the Court identify any constitutional
reason why a treaty provision, like U.N. Charter’s Article 94(1),
requires congressional implementation.
That is, the Court
identifies no provision of the U.S. Constitution’s Article I, which
enumerates legislative powers, that indicates that only Congress is
empowered to enact legislation necessary to bring the United
States into compliance with the judgments of international
tribunals.
Worse still, although the Court’s opinion is not a model of
clarity on the point,94 the Court suggests that a statement by either
the President or the Senate, or even by other parties to the treaty,
before or after ratification may suffice to make a treaty self93

Id. at 528 & n.14.
See Bradley, supra note 66, at 544 (acknowledging that the opinion is
“somewhat unclear” about whose intent a court should consult in determining
whether a treaty is self-executing).
94
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executing.95 Thus, for example, the President could state his
understanding that a treaty would be self-executing after receiving
the Senate’s advice and consent and without communicating that
understanding to the Senate in advance of its consideration of the
treaty. Similarly, the Senate could make a treaty self-executing by
stating its intention to do so during its treaty deliberations.
Following Medellín, such a statement could be effective if the
President is silent on the subject of self-execution.
3. Political Solutions
While the specter of an untenable international law dualism
haunts the U.S. legal order, political mechanisms exist that can
minimize the consequences of the current law’s incoherence. In
the space remaining, this Article addresses three such political
options.
First and perhaps most importantly, the political branches
frequently bypass the rather onerous Article II requirements of
advice and consent by two-thirds of the Senate, choosing instead to
commit the United States to international agreements through
executive-legislative agreements or through sole executive
agreements.96 In recent decades, nearly ninety percent of the
United States’ international obligations have arisen through
mechanisms other than Article II treaties.97 Executive-legislative
agreements require the approval of simple majorities in both
Houses of Congress; that is, they are international agreements that
are made binding as domestic law through the same process that
applies to federal statutes.98 Sole executive agreements are mostly
95

See id. (noting that the Medellín majority found its determination confirmed
by the post-ratification understandings of other treaty parties).
96
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238 (2008)
[hereinafter Hathaway, Treaties End] (noting that the United States makes
binding international agreements through two separate processes, one of which
is laid out in the Constitution and one that is not).
97
Id. at 1258 tbl.1, 1260 tbl.2 (listing by category 375 treaties and 2744
congressional-executive agreements entered into by the United States between
1980 and 2000).
98
CRS, TREATIES, supra note 75, at 5.
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used to bind the United States in its foreign relations and rarely
have domestic consequences. They bind the United States without
any congressional participation. 99
Under current law, there is no principled reasoning that
determines when our government enters into international
obligations through one method or the other.100 Oona Hathaway
has argued that the United States could jettison entirely the
cumbersome and constitutionally problematic treaty mechanism.
Because they accord with our constitutional legislative processes,
executive-legislative agreements have greater normative
legitimacy and are more likely to achieve adherence.101 The use of
executive-legislative agreements eliminates any separation of
powers concerns because Congress implements the agreement as
soon as it is entered into. There are no federalism concerns with
respect to such international agreements because there is no
controversy regarding the supremacy of congressional enactments
over state law.
Most sole executive agreements do not raise federalism issues.
Courts have for the most part recognized their supremacy over
state law pursuant to the Presidents foreign affairs powers.102
99

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (taking note of
congressional acquiescence in the practice of sole executive agreements and also
of court precedent recognizing “that the President does have some measure of
power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and
consent of the Senate”).
100
See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding the
validity of a “surrender agreement” between the United States and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda despite the fact that the agreement
took the form of a congressional-executive agreement and there was no
precedent for such an agreement, which was akin to an extradition agreement,
taking the form of anything but an Article II treaty).
101
Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 96, at 1241 (arguing that “nearly
everything that is done through the Treaty Clause can and should be done
through congressional-executive agreements”).
102
See RAMSEY, supra note 11, 283–299 (discussing American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).) In Garamendi, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down, by a 5–4 vote, a California insurance regulation act
on the ground that it interfered with the President’s ability to conduct foreign
relations).
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However, their relationship to federal statutes remains unsettled.103
The problem is not particularly troubling because the executive
utilizes this form of international agreement primarily to govern
relations between the United States and other states or international
entities, and the authority of the President to do so as the “sole
organ” of U.S. foreign relations is widely acknowledged.104
Second, given the need for congressional cooperation on the
implementation of treaties that have domestic consequences, the
President simply ought not to ratify treaties unless and until he has
lined up support for the required implementing legislation. To the
extent that the domestic implementation of a treaty regime costs
money, this is true whether the treaty is self-executing or non-selfexecuting. Either way, if the treaty is to have domestic efficacy,
Congress must appropriate money, and so there is no point in
entering into a treaty regime without first securing support for that
regime in both Houses of Congress. Indeed, because the
Constitution requires the President to “take care” that the laws are
faithfully executed,105 the President may have a constitutional duty
to ensure such support and such implementation. To the extent
that treaties are laws, the President has a constitutional duty to
ensure that Congress implements substantive treaty provisions.106
Finally, if all else fails and the United States is unable to abide
by its international obligations by incorporating treaty norms into
the domestic legal order, the President should give appropriate
notice and lawfully withdraw the United States from the treaty
regime.107 This solution is obviously not optimal, but it at least
103

CRS, TREATIES, supra note 75, at 5.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) .
105
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 .
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Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (concluding that the Take Care
Clause entails a presidential duty to execute treaties); Edward T. Swaine, Taking
Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 343–46 (2008) (assembling key
statements from the Framers expressing the view that the President’s Take Care
duties includes a duty to execute treaties).
107
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), arts. 54–64 (providing mechanisms for
lawful withdrawal from treaty obligations).
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prevents any U.S. violation of its treaty obligations from being
long-standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause contemplates
a monist system in which treaty obligations would automatically
become a part of the U.S. domestic legal order, structural,
constitutional impediments, sounding in principles of federalism
and separation of powers, present challenges to automatic treaty
supremacy. The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín further
complicates these structural impediments to monism and in fact
puts the United States on a path towards a dualist model that could
negatively affect U.S. foreign relations. The United States has thus
far been able to exploit its economic, diplomatic, and military
strength to avoid any legal penalties that have arisen from its
violation of its international treaty obligations. As a result, its
current practice more resembles a dualist system, in which the
federal government makes certain international commitments that
it is unable to incorporate into the domestic legal order. There
being no readily identifiable legal penalties for the resulting
breaches, there really are two distinct legal orders; one pertaining
to the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs, and
another pertaining to the United States in the conduct of its
domestic affairs.
Should the United States relinquish its status as the world’s
lone remaining superpower, it may be forced to confront the
consequences of this dualism. There may be, from a legal
perspective, no way to reconcile the Supremacy Clause’s monism
with federalism and separation of powers principles. It thus falls to
the political branches to work out a political solution so as to avoid
repeated lapses in the United States’ fulfillment of its treaty
obligations.
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